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                                                             ABSTRACT  
 
We investigate in this article the character of the market for corporate control (i.e. 
takeovers) in French and German banking. Its key feature is the marked ability of 
French and German banks to resist unsolicited takeover bids especially, although not 
exclusively, those from foreign competitors. We present an institutional perspective to 
account for the restrained character of takeovers in French and German banking. Our 
perspective is composed of two elements. First, institutional arrangements are important 
since they structure power relations among firm stakeholders by providing 
opportunities, as well as imposing constraints, to influence the decision-making process 
in which takeover transactions take place. Second, institutional arrangements provide 
firm stakeholders with several, not just one, potential opportunities to block unsolicited 
bids since takeover contests are composed of sequences of decisions for which approval 
is needed at each stage. French and German banks have used different mixes of 
institutional arrangements, themselves located at different stages of takeover 
transactions, to secure restrained markets for corporate control. Our institutional 
analysis, in turn, also illustrates an important shortcoming of banking sector 
protectionism, namely the contribution of protection from unsolicited takeover bids to 
the building of banks carrying systemic risks. 
 
Introduction  
 
We investigate in this article the character of the market for corporate control (i.e. 
takeovers) in French and German banking, namely the marked ability of domestic banks 
to resist unsolicited takeover bids especially, although not exclusively, those from 
foreign competitors. The market for corporate control in the two largest Eurozone 
members is characterized by the restrained presence of non-domestic financial 
institutions as foreign acquisitions of French and German banks of considerable size 
have been severely limited (Clark and Wojcik, 2007; Culpepper, 2011: 48-81).
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 Yet, 
from their position of overall protection from unsolicited bids, large French and German 
banks have themselves been active participants in the market for corporate control as 
acquirers, thereby enabling them to expand their operations. The fast-paced 
consolidation of the banking sector in the two countries has largely taken the form of 
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negotiated transactions mainly, although not exclusively, among domestic financial 
institutions (Carletti and Vives, 2009). This acquisition spree has also resulted in the 
substantial growth in asset size of French and German banks in relation to the countries 
in which they are chartered, i.e. they have become too-big-to-fail (Goldstein and Véron, 
2011). Thus, our analysis illustrates a shortcoming of banking sector protectionism, an 
important feature of this special issue on foreign ownership in banking (Epstein, 2014a), 
namely the contribution of protection from unsolicited takeover bids to the building of 
banks carrying systemic risks. What, then, accounts for the presence of restrained 
takeovers in French and German banking?  
        We present an institutional perspective composed of two elements to account for 
the ability of French and German banks to resist unsolicited takeover bids. First, 
institutions are influential in shaping power relations among firm stakeholders by 
providing opportunities, as well as imposing constraints, to influence the decision-
making process in which takeover transactions take place (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Roe, 
1993). Institutions enable different categories of actors to push for their favorite 
outcomes -- an important factor given the wide distributional consequences associated 
with variations in the prominence of takeovers (Campbell, 2004; Gourevitch and Shinn, 
2005). However, an institutional analysis is also counter-intuitive for this investigation 
of takeovers in French and German banking. Scholars working within an institutional 
perspective traditionally highlight how variations in institutions provide substantial 
insights to account for observed differences in outcomes across countries (Dobbin, 
1994; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Katzenstein, 1977). The emphasis on institutional 
variation to explain differences in outcomes also reflects a broader conceptualization of 
causality. Institutional approaches rarely advance the notion that only institutions matter 
for outcomes; rather they are conceptualized as mid-level variables (as distinct from 
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macro-structures) that act as mid-range theory (Hall, 1986). Thus, the empirical puzzle 
for an institutional perspective is that France and Germany reached the same outcome – 
namely, restrained markets for takeovers in banking via the ability of banks to resist 
unsolicited bids -- but through some markedly distinct institutions. The institutional 
arrangements of the two countries exhibit important differences in takeover 
transactions; most notably, but not exclusively, with regard to the influence of the state 
in France; and the importance of tightly linked corporate networks of firms and the 
presence of Co-determined boards of directors in Germany (Gordon, 2004; Jabko and 
Massoc, 2012; Kogut and Walker, 2001).  
         Second, we argue that the common outcome of restrained takeovers in French and 
German banking also illustrates the presence of alternative institutional paths by which 
domestic banks, through different institutional means, have achieved protection against 
unsolicited bids. The reason for the presence of alternative institutional paths is that the 
completion of takeovers takes place along a sequence of decisions characterized by 
different stages at which actors could rely on institutional arrangements to block 
unwanted transactions (Roe, 1993; Schneper and Guillen, 2004). French and German 
banks have used different mixes of institutional arrangements, themselves located at 
different stages of takeover transactions, to secure restrained markets for corporate 
control. Our analysis, moreover, provides interesting insights for the causal influence of 
institutions. Scholars in the social sciences increasingly highlight that institutions are 
part of a phenomenon of complex causation characterized by greater sophistication than 
the traditional research design of matching variations in institutions with differences in 
outcomes (Ragin, 1987). Yet, institutions in settings of complex causation could 
generate the outcome of interest as a result of an intersection of different factors or, as 
illustrated by our investigation of takeovers in banking, via different but functionally 
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equivalent paths (Hall, 2003; Mahoney, 2008). We illustrate that there are several 
institutional paths by which institutions provide protection from takeovers.  
          The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, we highlight that low 
foreign ownership in French and German banking reflects not only the failure of the EU 
internal market to promote cross-borders competition that would serve as a check on the 
systemic growth of banks, but also the ability of domestic banks to resist unsolicited 
takeover bids. Second, we analyze how our institutional approach enables us to capture 
the process of causal inference by which institutional diversity can generate a similar 
outcome with a focus on takeovers. The following two sections provide an analytical 
overview of the different institutional paths by which French and German banks have 
been largely insulated from foreign takeover attempts and its implications for the 
building of systemic risks in the banking sector.      
The Market for Corporate Control in French and German Banking: Its 
Contextual Relevance in the EU Single Market   
 
Foreign ownership in French and German banking is relatively low. In France, the 
presence of foreign banks is limited at around 12 percent of total bank assets (Hardie 
and Howarth, 2009: 1021). The corresponding figure for Germany is a mere nine 
percent of total bank assets (IMF, 2011: 44). We highlight in this article the relevance of 
the study of takeovers to understand this outcome. Our analysis of French and German 
banking illustrates how different sets of institutional arrangements (independent 
variable) in the two countries have enabled banks to secure restrained markets for 
corporate control (dependent variable). In turn, the protection from unsolicited bids has 
also been conducive to the active participation of French and German banks as acquirers 
on the market for corporate control (Carletti and Vives, 2009). The character of the 
market for corporate control in French and German banking has not served as a check 
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on the systemic growth of domestic banks. Therefore, the focus on takeovers expands 
our understanding of explanations seeking to account for low foreign ownership and the 
preservation of fragmentation of large EU banking markets along national lines, most 
notably those that emphasize the problems associated with international expansion via 
the opening of subsidiaries in foreign markets.  
         The internationalization of banks can occur via takeovers (external growth) or 
through the opening of subsidiaries (internal growth) (see also Epstein, 2014b in this 
volume). From this strategic angle, the promises of greater cross-borders market 
competition associated with the implementation of the internal market in retail banking 
did not materialize. The EU’s Second Banking Directive (1993) was introduced to 
promote competition in the sector by authorizing any financial institution to establish 
branches anywhere in the EU if it is authorized to operate in one of its member states 
(Story and Walter, 1997). Nonetheless, the (West) European banking market remains 
segmented along national lines with cross-country penetration being limited (Goddard, 
Molyneux, and Wilson 2010; Carletti and Vives, 2009). In particular, retail banking 
services are currently fragmented on a national basis despite the implementation of an 
impressive series of legal measures of financial integration at the EU level (Grossman 
and Leblond, 2011).         
         Foreign banks seeking to enter the markets of Europe’s two largest economies via 
the opening of subsidiaries face important barriers – which constitutes a significant 
difference with central and eastern Europe, where foreign bank ownership levels are 
high and subsidiarization is the normal form of expansion for foreign banks (Epstein 
2014b). The banking sectors of France and Germany are characterized by having one of 
the highest number of bank branches per capita among advanced capitalist economies 
that, in turn, makes it difficult for foreign financial institutions to develop a local 
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presence without incurring important sunk costs (Grossman and Leblond, 2011: 429; 
IMF, 2011). The extensiveness of bank branching in the two countries reflects the 
importance of information asymmetries, the high degrees of specialization of the three 
pillars (commercial banks, saving banks, and the co-operative/mutual sector), and the 
privileges enjoyed by some financial institutions that, in turn, have promoted 
competition between sectors in the form of incentives for branch opening (Deeg, 1999; 
Loriaux, 1991: 65-72). In France, for instance, mutual and savings banks had, until 
early 2009, a monopoly over the use of the ‘Livret A’, the most widely used, tax free 
savings account. The privileged access to state-subsidized credit for agriculture and 
rural housing of Crédit Agricole, France’s giant co-operative bank, acted as an 
important incentive to build the country’s largest retail network. In Germany, on the 
other hand, the three banking pillars (commercial, regionally-based public sector, and 
cooperatives) are universal banks that compete extensively for the provision of a series 
of services to SMEs, most notably in the areas of long-term commercial financing and 
management consulting. Local proximity in the retail banking sector, as provided by a 
bank’s branch network, is important in order to overcome difficulties associated with 
the acquisition of financial information on SMEs. Thus, foreign banks seeking to extend 
their activities by opening branches in France and Germany face serious obstacles from 
domestic banks with an already established extensive network.  
         However, the difficulties associated with entering the French and German markets 
via internal growth (i.e. subsidiarization) do not constitute a complete explanation for 
the overall low rates of foreign ownership in the two countries. Takeovers would 
constitute an interesting strategic alternative to overcome these barriers to entry and 
enable banks to gain a foothold in other EU markets characterized by extensively 
developed branch networks with high customer loyalty and extensive switching costs. 
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This is an important factor in why the study of the market for corporate control in 
French and German banking is particularly insightful. The EU-driven liberalization of 
the banking sector has indeed favored movements of concentration via takeovers, but at 
the domestic level, not via cross-border transactions (Carletti and Vives, 2009). Cross-
border incursions into France and Germany have remained limited in the area of 
banking – that is, unsolicited acquisitions of domestic banks by foreign rivals have been 
rare (Clark and Wojcik, 2007; Culpepper, 2011). Why, then, is the external strategy of 
entry via takeovers appreciably difficult for foreign banks seeking to develop a presence 
in France and Germany?  
 
The Restrained Market for Corporate Control in French and German Banking: 
An Institutional Perspective  
 
The market for corporate control in French and German banking is characterized by the 
overall protection of domestic banks against unsolicited takeover bids from (foreign) 
rivals.
2
  The two instances of a foreign acquisition of a large domestic bank are that of 
Credit Commercial de France which fell under the control of HSBC in 2000; and of 
Hypo Vereinsbank which was acquired by Unicredit in 2006 – both of these being 
friendly/negotiated transactions. 
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 What accounts for the overall restrained markets for 
corporate control in French and German banking?  
         We present an institutional perspective composed of two elements to account for 
the specific characteristics of takeovers in French and German banking. The first 
element of our institutional perspective highlights that institutions not only constrain 
courses of action, but also support and empower actors in translating their preferences 
into outcomes (Campbell, 2004; Garrett and Lange, 1995; Hall, 1986). Institutional 
arrangements act as constraints that reduce the range of feasible options. They also 
8 
 
structure power relations among actors by offering access in an unsymmetrical manner 
to, and thus influence over, the decision making process in which important decisions 
are taken (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Steinmo and Thelen, 1992). Takeover contests take 
place at the firm-level between companies, but do not occur in an institutional vacuum 
as actors are embedded in different institutional settings across advanced capitalist 
economies (Schneper and Guillen, 2004). Institutional arrangements provide different 
categories of actors across national settings with different degrees of power and 
influence over corporate decisions that, in turn, enable them to defend their interests 
against other firm stakeholders with opposing preferences (Fligstein, 1990; Gourevitch 
and Shinn, 2005).  
         The second element of our institutional perspective highlights that takeover 
contests are composed of sequences of decisions for which approval is needed at each 
stage, thereby providing their opponents with several, not just one, potential 
opportunities to block unsolicited bids at different institutional locations (Roe, 1993; 
Schneper and Guillen, 2004). The distribution of institutional arrangements located at 
different points along the chain of decisions for the successful completion of takeovers 
shapes the relative weight of firm stakeholders to secure their favorite outcomes (see 
more generally Immergut, 1992). In other words, there are several alternative, and thus 
non-rival, opportunities by which institutional arrangements enable firm stakeholders to 
successfully oppose takeover bids (Capron and Guillen, 2009; Culpepper, 2011). 
Institutions can enable firm stakeholders to defeat actual (and potential) takeover bids in 
four ways: deterring unsolicited bids from being attempted, limiting the ability of 
bidders to secure enough outstanding shares during the bidding process, requiring the 
formal approval of regulatory authorities and policy-makers, and by limiting the ability 
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of an acquirer to restructure the assets of the target company in the post-acquisition 
reorganization process.  
        First, national systems of corporate governance characterized by the prominence of 
the institutional arrangement of ownership concentration, for instance, enable 
companies to deter unsolicited takeover bids (Culpepper, 2011: 25-47; Roe, 1993). The 
presence of a large blockholder which is unwilling to depart with its stake can act as an 
effective deterrent to unsolicited takeover bids. Second, national systems of corporate 
law characterized by the presence of anti-takeover defense mechanisms and deviations 
from the one share-one vote standard, on the other hand, make it appreciably more 
difficult for bidders to acquire other companies during the formal bidding process 
(Gordon, 2004; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). The presence of insiders with additional 
voting power, such as double voting rights, for having kept their shares for a pre-
determined period of time (usually for two years) would make it easier to defeat the 
efforts of newcomers who have to acquire shares at their full price but without 
additional voting power (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; European Commission, 2006). A 
third institutional arrangement that could enable firm stakeholders to resist unsolicited 
takeover bids is the regulatory process of approval of takeovers, which is characterized 
by substantial cross-national differences with regard to the legal mandate and degree of 
independence of regulatory authorities (Thatcher, 2002; Vogel, 1998). These 
institutional differences in regulatory frameworks could constitute important factors 
protecting domestic companies, even those with ownership diffusion, given the 
perceived unpopularity of takeovers for employment issues – a concern magnified in the 
case of cross-border deals (Roe, 2000). Finally, the gains associated with takeovers are 
often contingent upon the ability of the acquiring company to restructure and reorganize 
the activities of the acquired firm which could entail resource deployment in the form of 
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employee layoffs (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Capron and Guillen, 2009). The presence 
of institutional constraints, such as stringent legal rights of employment protection, 
enable insiders (employees and managers) to better defend their interests by limiting the 
ability of an acquirer to restructure the assets of the target company in the post-
acquisition reorganization process (OECD, 2004; Schneper and Guillen, 2004).   
         Our institutional perspective on the market for corporate control in French and 
German banking provides important insights that connect to a broader theoretical issue 
in political science and economic sociology and, thus, extend beyond the confines of the 
study of banking and takeovers, namely the influence of institutions in settings of causal 
complexity. Our analysis helps solve an apparent puzzle of this article, namely how 
could an institutional perspective account for the ability of French and German banks to 
achieve a similar outcome, that of overall protection from unsolicited takeover bids, 
despite the presence of significant differences in their institutional settings (see the 
following two sections). Our analysis, moreover, also provides important insights on the 
failure of existing analyses of takeovers to properly conceptualize the role of institutions 
as independent variables in takeover transactions. We proceed to present the theoretical 
insights of our institutional analysis in the remainder of this section.  
         Analyses of the market for corporate control have been dominated by two types of 
investigations: economic theory of regulation and large N empirical studies. The first 
standard approach to the study of takeovers is the economic theory of regulation 
associated with the law and economics literature. The core insight of the economic 
theory of regulation is that the intensity of the preferences of firm stakeholders for 
specific takeover outcomes constitutes the most important causal variable (Bebchuk and 
Ferrell, 1999; Romano, 1987). The main issue is not about the merits of the preferences 
of different actors for specific takeover outcomes, but reflects the intensity of these 
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preferences that, in turn, is shaped by the extent to which their interests are concentrated 
or dispersed (Stigler, 1983). Takeovers are often associated with asymmetric 
distributional consequences for firm stakeholders, with concentrated costs in the form of 
job losses imposed on managers and employees (Haverman and Cohen, 1994). Minority 
shareholders of targeted companies, meanwhile, maximize their wealth in the form of 
the diffused benefits associated with high takeover premiums (Roe, 1993). 
         However, while the economic theory of regulation performs a useful job in 
identifying the potential differences in the intensity of preferences of various actors, the 
perspective remains incomplete. If the market for corporate control is indeed 
characterized by concentrated costs for managers/employees and diffused benefits for 
shareholders, what then accounts for the presence of extensively documented empirical 
differences across economies regarding the prominence of takeovers? More specifically, 
under which circumstances would companies succeed in securing protection from 
takeovers? Managers (and employees) with high preference intensity do not always win 
(Culpepper, 2011). An important shortcoming of the economic theory of regulation, 
therefore, concerns its failure to analyze the translation of intensity preference into 
takeover outcomes (see more generally Garrett and Lange, 1995). The incentives and 
preferences of different categories of actors in takeover transactions do not (necessarily) 
change across national systems of corporate governance, but their ability to advance 
their interests is shaped by local institutional settings (Roe, 1993; Schneper and Guillen, 
2004). Thus, the first element of our institutional perspective illustrates the importance 
of institutional arrangements in enabling specific categories of firm stakeholders to 
secure protection against takeovers. 
        The second standard approach to the study of takeovers is based on numerous 
large-N studies designed to uncover the relationship between different types of 
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independent variables and important takeover outcomes (see King et al., 2004 for an 
overview). These studies of the market for corporate control highlight the absence of 
consistent empirical results across national systems of corporate governance -- as well 
as within countries over time – on important indicators: takeover premiums, post-
acquisition performance, and the effects of legal reforms protecting minority 
shareholders (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Goergen et al., 2005). That is, large-N studies 
reveal no consistent relationships between hypothesized independent and dependent 
variables.  
         Moreover, the failure of existing large N-empirical studies to uncover consistent 
empirical relationships connects to an interesting counter-intuitive feature of our 
institutional analysis of takeovers in French and German banking. That is why, despite 
different sets of institutions, do we nevertheless see the two countries reaching equally 
restrained markets for corporate control in the banking sector? This outcome is puzzling 
for important streams of institutional analyses in political science and economic 
sociology given their methodological aim built around a specific research design, 
namely how the presence of institutional differences (usually cross-national) account for 
observed variations in outcomes, especially with regard to distinctive trajectories of 
change under common challenges (Dobbin, 1994; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Katzenstein, 
1977). The selection of this research design reflects the conceptualization of causality of 
these streams of institutional analyses: institutions acting as mid-level variables that 
operate at the level of mid-range theory (Hall, 1986; Steinmo and Thelen, 1992). The 
question then is how, exactly, distinct institutions in the two countries cause a similar 
outcome in restrained takeovers in banking.  
         The second element of our institutional perspective builds upon these mid-range 
institutional streams, since these do not always translate specifically into predictions 
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about takeovers, or indeed other kinds of important macro-political/economic outcomes. 
Starting from the notion that institutions are important but are not the sole causal factor, 
we seek to contextualize the influence of institutional arrangements on outcomes by 
emphasizing the specific characteristics of the complex causal settings in which they are 
embedded. The insights of institutionally-based approaches in political science and 
economic sociology correctly highlight the dangers inherent in piecemeal analysis 
devoid of sensitivities to context, namely that the impact of a single institution is 
contingent upon the overall institutional configuration in which it is embedded (Hall, 
1986; Soskice, 1999). However, these institutional approaches do not always provide 
enough analytical hints for the identification of the specific form of the complex setting 
in which institutions are embedded (Hall, 2003; Ragin, 1987). The causal impact of 
institutions over important outcomes varies across settings of complex causation in 
which they are embedded. Institutions could generate the outcome of interest on the 
dependent variable as a result of being part of specific intersections of conditions; 
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 or, 
as highlighted by our investigation of the characteristics of takeovers in French and 
German banking, via different but functionally equivalent paths (Mahoney, 2008; 
Ragin, 1987).  
         Our institutional perspective on the market for corporate control in French and 
German banking illustrates the precise paths through which institutions and outcomes 
are linked in different ways across national settings, thereby moving beyond the 
correlational thinking of research design based on differences in institutions to explain 
variations in outcomes (see also Immergut. 1992). The concept of substitutability, i.e. 
the presence of different but functionally equivalent paths, highlights that the causal 
influence of institutions does not require a constant corresponding match between the 
joint presence of an institutional-independent variable and the dependent variable 
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(Braumoeller, 2003). Moreover, the concept of substitutability is also ontologically 
insightful for the study of the market for corporate control given that institutional 
arrangements enable firm stakeholders to resist unsolicited bids at four different points 
along the chain of decisions for the successful completion of takeovers (see above 
discussion). Finally, our institutional perspective is informative in accounting for the 
lack of consistent empirical results associated with large N studies of takeovers as 
presented above. The understanding of causation of large-N studies is built around the 
notion of an “effects-of-causes” approach, whereby the aim is to estimate and generalize 
the average impact of independent variables across a large number of cases (Mahoney, 
2008). This conceptualization results in the inability of large-N empirical studies to 
differentiate between types of complex causation in the assessment of the causal 
inference of hypothesized independent variables (Braumoeller, 2003; Hall, 2003). We 
suggest that the lack of consistent empirical results can be attributed to the presence of 
different institutional arrangements that provide protection against takeovers that are not 
accounted for in large-N studies.   
 
 
The Market for Corporate Control in French Banking 
The French banking sector is dominated by four financial institutions: two large listed 
commercial banks (BNP-Paribas and Société Générale) and two mutual banks (Banque 
Populaire-Caisse d’Épargne (BPCE) and Crédit Agricole). The presence of foreign 
banks in France is fairly limited at around 12 percent of total bank assets (Hardie and 
Howarth, 2009: 1021). The French banking sector is also characterized by the systemic 
character of its banks: the combined financial assets of the top five banks relative to 
GDP being 344% in 2009 – the similar figure for the United States was 58% (Goldstein 
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and Véron, 2011: 39). The systemic growth of large French banks in the last fifteen 
years is impressive with the notable exception of Société Générale (see Table 1). While 
all of the top four French banks experienced growth on their asset side as a result of 
their (costly) exposure to structured products (securitization) in the United States 
(Hardie and Howarth, 2009), Société Générale stands out as a financial institution 
which has been substantially less active on the market for corporate control as an 
acquirer. In other words, external growth via takeovers constitutes an important 
component of systemic growth in French banking. The characteristics of the market for 
corporate control in French banking, namely limited foreign presence coupled with 
important consolidations among domestic actors, highlight the importance of four 
different mechanisms through which institutions contributed to this outcome. These 
mechanisms are: 1) the role of state activism in the construction of ownership 
concentration, 2) the availability of deviations from the one share-one vote standard as a 
protective mechanism, 3) the veto power of state officials over takeover approval in the 
banking and insurance sectors, and 4) the role of the state in protecting domestic banks 
in the 2008-09 financial crisis.   
 
Insert Table 1 here.  
 
First, French policy-makers were highly influential in the construction of the 
concentrated character of the ownership structure of domestic companies (including 
banks). The largest three commercial banks (Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), Crédit 
Lyonnais, and Société Générale) were nationalized in 1945, at first to remove 
bottlenecks in the economy (Hall, 1986: 242-244). The banking system also constituted 
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a powerful instrument in the hands of policy-makers to shape the allocation of capital in 
the economy from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s (Zysman, 1977 and 1983).  
         The new macroeconomic regime of the European Monetary system (EMS) in the 
1980s witnessed the continuation of the role of the state in the protection of banks from 
unwanted takeover bids, but for different purposes. The influence of the state was 
preponderant in the process of privatization (Société Générale in 1986, BNP in 1993) 
with the extensive use of a network of hard-core cross-shareholders (Schmidt 1996: 
369-392; see also Hancké, 2002: 60-65). French policy-makers picked a group of three 
to seven companies with an equity stake ranging from two to ten percent to serve as 
long-term shareholders for privatized companies from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s – 
thereby providing a deterrent against unsolicited takeover bids. The design of the 
privatization process in this period was also driven by the new macroeconomic policy of 
the EMS whereby French policymakers sought to tackle inflation via higher interest 
rates that, in turn, pushed French companies to finance investment projects from 
internal sources rather than from bank loans (Levy, 1999: 264-284). The role of French 
banks was primarily conceptualized as that of providers of capital in the form of equity 
stakes in other privatized firms in order to deter takeovers (Morin, 1998b; see also 
Schmidt, 1996: 369-392). The promotion of domestic firms as national champions 
experienced a change of means in the banking sphere: from the provision of cheap 
capital in corporate finance to the provision of protection in corporate governance, 
thereby illustrating the redeployment of state intervention with the use of the same 
instrument of ownership concentration but on the behalf of new objectives (Jabko and 
Massoc, 2012; Levy, 2005). 
         The privatization process from the mid-1990s onward was characterized by the 
continuation of protection from hostile takeovers but through the selection of one large 
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blockholder with a controlling stake in newly privatized banks as opposed to reliance on 
a network of hard-core, cross-shareholders (Morin, 1998b). This new scheme was 
particularly important in insulating French banks from unsolicited takeover bids and in 
enabling them to grow via negotiated mergers: the heavily indebted state-owned Crédit 
Lyonnais became a fully owned subsidiary of Crédit Agricole (France’s largest mutual 
bank); Crédit Mutuel purchased a majority stake in Crédit Industriel et Commercial, 
thereby creating a regionally-based giant financial institution; and the state-sponsored 
merger between Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Épargne was designed to contain the 
financial losses associated with Natixis, their jointly owned investment bank.  
         Second, the market for corporate control in French banking is also characterized 
by the use of a second, and alternative, institutional arrangement, namely the ability of 
companies to rely on deviations from the one share-one vote standard especially, but not 
exclusively, for those without substantial ownership concentration (Clift, 2009: 69; 
Culpepper, 2011: 67-77). French firms are the leading European users, alongside 
Scandinavian companies, of deviations from the one share-one vote standard in the form 
of unequal voting rights that award additional voting power (usually double voting 
rights) to investors who have kept their shares for a pre-determined period of time 
(usually two years), poison pills whereby new stocks could be issued to existing 
shareholders at discounted prices, shareholder agreements restraining the transfer of 
securities, and voting right ceilings that limit the amount of votes any shareholder may 
cast regardless of the number of stocks held (EU Commission, 2006). Moreover, the use 
of deviations from the one share-one vote standard correlates well with the ownership 
structure of companies: dispersed ownership firms are more likely to rely on voting 
right ceilings; medium concentrated ownership firms are more likely to use double 
voting rights and/or shareholder agreements (see e.g. Goyer and Jung, 2011). Among 
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French banks without a large controlling owner, Société Générale (diffused ownership) 
has a by-law provision whereby voting rights are limited to 15% of outstanding shares 
while BNP-Paribas (medium ownership concentration) has a shareholder agreement 
with its largest blockholder, namely AXA, which could increase its stakes via the use of 
poison pills. French corporate law places impediments on unsolicited takeovers by 
enabling companies to rely on deviations from the one share-one vote standard. 
        Third, the restrained market for corporate control in French banking also illustrates 
the ability of policymakers to use their veto over takeover bids in the banking/insurance 
sectors in order to favor the building of large domestic corporations and, as a result, 
exclude foreign rivals (Clift, 2009). The BNP-Société Générale-Paribas takeover contest 
that took place in 1999 illustrates the process by which French policymakers are able to 
use their legislative autonomy to set deadlines and decide which bank could participate 
in competing takeover bids, and what percentage is required to pursue for a full bid in 
the event of a non-majority acquisition (Hernández-Lopez, 2003). In early 1999, Société 
Générale (a retail bank) announced a friendly and negotiated all-share bid for Paribas 
(an investment bank). About a month later, BNP (another retail bank) launched a 
counter, unsolicited takeover bid in the form of an equity swap for both Paribas and 
Société Générale – the former in order to avoid being shut off from investment banking; 
the latter in order to become the world’s largest bank. In response, Société Générale 
launched a counter hostile bid for BNP that led to an intensive six months’ contest 
characterized by many counter-bids.  
         The role of French policymakers in this takeover contest contributed to the 
preservation of the domestic character of the banking sector in two ways. In the first 
place, officials in the Ministry of Finance used their power to decide who could 
participate in takeover contests when there are multiple offers. In effect, this meant the 
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exclusion from the bidding process of two foreign banks who had in the meantime 
shown signs of interest, namely Deustche Bank and Lloyd’s TSB (Ibid: 168). Moreover, 
French policymakers used their legislative authority to approve/reject takeover bids by 
specifying the percentages needed for control in the event of a non-majority acquisition 
(Ibid: 170). By early August 1999, BNP had succeeded in acquiring 65.2% of Paribas 
but only 31.8% of Société Générale. French regulators ruled that BNP could have 
control of Paribas, but not Société Générale and that it had to return all tendered shares 
of the latter to their original owners. This decision was largely justified on the basis of 
employment concerns. The investment banking activities of Paribas were highly 
complementary to those of BNP. However, the retail banking activities of BNP and 
Société Générale overlapped, thereby generating fears that BNP would have to finance 
its acquisition of Société Générale via employment reductions.  
         Finally, the financial crisis of 2008-09 highlighted the ability of French policy-
makers to further consolidate the banking industry around the stabilization of large 
financial institutions immune from unwanted takeover attempts. An important aspect of 
the role of the state in France, and in other advanced capitalist economies, during the 
2008-09 financial crisis has been the provision of liquidity to struggling financial 
institutions in the form of credit guarantees (Weber and Schmitz, 2011; see also 
Donnelly, 2014 in this volume). The aim was to prevent the financial crisis from 
spreading to the rest of the economy. French policy-makers, however, went further than 
simply rescuing troubled financial institutions. Several features characterized state 
activism during this period (Jabko and Massoc, 2012). The first feature is that rescue 
funds did not take the form of individual bank bailouts, but involved the creation of two 
new fully state-owned corporations -- Société de Prise de Participations de l’État 
(SPPE) and Société de Financement de l’Économie (SFEF) – specifically designed to 
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recapitalize banks and provide funding to financial institutions in the specific context of 
the credit crunch. Building on the presence of strong interbank ties and the collective 
negotiation capacities of French financial institutions, these two newly created entities 
were designed to enable banks to draw funding irrespective of their financial health, 
thereby illustrating the collective character of the French rescue scheme as opposed to 
individualized bailout packages prevalent in many EU member states (Grossman and 
Woll, 2014). Moreover, the collective character of the French rescue scheme enabled 
policy-makers to further restrain the market for corporate control. For instance, the 
investment arm of the French state (SPPE) acquired 17% of the stock of BNP-Paribas in 
the form of non-voting shares at the same time as the largest French bank was itself 
buying the Belgian operations of Fortis. Thus, BNP-Paribas tapped the rescue funds not 
only because of liquidity concerns, but to obtain the financing necessary to acquire a 
Belgian bank.
5
 
         The second feature of state activism during the 2008-09 financial crisis is that the 
provision of funding was a relatively conflict-free operation orchestrated by a small 
number of individuals working in banks or in the upper echelons of the civil service. 
They had a common educational and professional background in finance and, perhaps 
more importantly, the provision of funding was not imposed on banks (Grossman and 
Woll, 2014; Jabko and Massoc, 2012). In fact, the French government demanded 
relatively little in return for its financial support: policy-makers did not seek seats on the 
boards of financially troubled banks, and financial institutions that received state 
support were still able to continue awarding dividends to their shareholders.  
         The third feature of state activism in the 2008-09 financial crisis is the state-
orchestrated merger between Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Épargne in the wake of 
significant financial losses. Natixis, the small investment bank owned jointly by these 
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two banks, recorded the highest losses of any French bank as a result of its involvement 
in the US subprime market (Hardie and Howarth, 2009). Its poor performance acted as a 
catalyst for Sarkozy’s inner circle to put together the merger between Banque Populaire 
and Caisse d’Épargne (now BPCE) and, in the process, received over seven billion 
Euros in various forms of state support (Jabko and Massoc, 2012). The specific 
characteristics of the merger were designed by François Pérol, Sarkozy’s chief 
economic adviser who previously had a key role in the setup of SPPE and SFEF, and 
who was then appointed as the first CEO of the newly merged group.  
         We conclude the discussion of the French case with the following two comments 
that highlight how overall protection against unsolicited bids translated into systemic 
growth via takeovers (see Table 1). The first one is the crucial role of the French state in 
the three most important takeover transactions of the last fifteen years: Banque 
Nationale de Paris-Paribas, Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais, and Banque Populaire-
Caisse d’Épargne. In the BNP-Paribas deal (1999), state officials at the Ministry of 
Finance allowed Banque Nationale de Paris to keep control of its majority stake in the 
smaller investment bank Paribas, but forced the relinquishment of its important, but 
minority, stake in the much larger Société Générale out of fears that the acquisition of 
the latter would have to be financed by downsizing and employment reductions in its 
larger rival (Hernández-Lopez, 2003). In the privatization process of Crédit Lyonnais 
(2003), French policy-makers selected Crédit Agricole over BNP-Paribas to become the 
new majority owner of the financially troubled state-owned financial institution (Jeffers, 
2013). This decision took place in the context of having previously allowed BNP-
Paribas to acquire over 15% of the shares of Crédit Lyonnais while the latter was still 
under state control. French policy-makers expected that Crédit Agricole, a mutualist 
bank with deposits largely exceeding loans, to be better placed to make substantial 
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investments in Crédit Lyonnais in order to preserve its future growth. In the Banque 
Populaire-Caisse d’Épargne merger (2009), state officials close to President Sarkozy 
orchestrated the merger between the two financial institutions in the wake of significant 
financial losses related to their involvement in the US subprime market – as well as 
providing significant financial assistance (Hardie and Howarth, 2009; Jabko and 
Massoc, 2012).  
         A second important feature of the systemic growth of French banks highlights the 
importance of equity as a means of payment in takeover contests. The takeover spree of 
French banks was characterized by the extensive use of non-cash considerations, i.e. 
either equity swap
6
 or the issue of new securities to finance acquisitions.
7
 In other 
words, the ability of French banks to translate overall protection into takeovers was 
facilitated by the use of equity as a means of payment.   
 
The Market for Corporate Control in German Banking  
 
The German banking sector is dominated by four commercial banks (Deutsche Bank, 
Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, and Deutsche Postbank), a system of regionally-based 
financial institutions owned by regional governments (Landesbanken), and one giant co-
operative bank (DZ Bank). The presence of foreign banks in Germany is limited, at a 
little over nine percent of total bank assets (IMF, 2011: 44). The German banking 
system is fairly concentrated with the combined financial assets of the top five banks 
relative to GDP amounting to 151% in 2009 as compared to only 58% in the United 
States (Goldstein and Véron, 2011: 39). German banks have exhibited striking 
divergence with regard to systemic growth in the last fifteen years in a pattern 
reminiscent of the French case. The top four German banks expanded, until 2009, as a 
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result of their exposure to structured products (securitization) in the United States 
(Hardie and Howarth, 2009 and 2013). However, only Deutsche Bank and 
Commerzbank recorded overall systemic growth (see table 2). An important aspect of 
this divergence reflects the involvement of Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank as 
acquirers of other domestic banks in friendly takeover transactions. DZ bank and 
Landesbanken, in contrast, face substantial obstacles from becoming active participants 
on the market for corporate control largely due to their legal status (IMF, 2011) (see 
discussion below). 
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
 
The characteristics of the market for corporate control in German banking share 
common features with that of France, namely limited foreign presence coupled with 
important consolidations among domestic actors. However, the sets of institutional 
arrangements that have enabled German companies to achieve protection from 
unsolicited takeover bids are markedly different from those found in France in many 
respects. For one thing, the anti-takeover measures that were previously used by some 
companies to deter and defeat unsolicited takeover bids, namely deviations from the one 
share-one vote standard, have been removed. From the early 1990s to the early 2000s, 
German policy-makers introduced important legal reforms in the financial sphere driven 
by the goal of financial modernization necessary for the development of liquid securities  
(Deeg, 2005), and by left-wing-SPD concerns about the power of banks in the German 
economy (Hoepner, 2007). The 1998 Law on Control and Transparency in Enterprises 
(KonTraG) included several elements of reforms aimed at strengthening the legal rights 
of minority shareholders by increasing financial transparency and by changing the 
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voting rules associated with shareholding. Its most important component was the 
elimination of deviations from the one share-one vote rule, such as voting caps or 
unequal voting rights in shareholders’ meetings, thereby potentially exposing firms 
without concentrated ownership to unsolicited takeover bids. Also important was the 
phase-out as of January 2002 of the of the capital gains tax on the sale of corporate 
shareholdings. This legislative change is conducive to the potential decline of cross-
shareholdings since selling shares of other companies is no longer subject to capital 
gains tax. As a result, corporate law in Germany has become the most minority 
shareholder-friendly in continental Europe given the changes in deviations from the one 
share-one vote rule, thereby depriving German companies of important institutional 
mechanisms of takeover protection even if this was clearly not the intended goal of 
policy-makers (Deeg, 2005).        
         Nonetheless, the German economy, and its banking sector, has not witnessed a 
flurry of unsolicited takeover bids from (foreign) rivals despite the elimination of 
deviations from the one share-one vote standard (Culpepper, 2011: 25-81). The 
restrained character of the market for corporate control in German banking highlights 
the importance of four institutional features. These features are: 1) the presence of 
tightly linked corporate networks, 2) the legal authority of Co-determined boards of 
directors to introduce anti-takeover measures, 3) the presence of strong employment 
protection laws that limit the range of post-acquisition restructuring schemes, and 4) the 
role of the German federal government in the 2008-09 financial crisis.  
         First, the ownership structure of the bulk of companies in the banking and the non-
financial sectors remains substantially concentrated, thereby deterring unsolicited bids 
(Culpepper, 2005; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005: 149-167). Yet, the overall stability of 
ownership concentration should not be interpreted as the absence of corporate 
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transactions regarding the acquisition of domestic companies. Many negotiated 
transactions among domestic banks took place: Allianz acquired Commerzbank (2001); 
Hypo Real Estate became the majority shareholder of Depfa Bank (2007); Dresdner 
Bank was acquired by Commerzbank (2008); and Deutsche Bank proceeded to buy 
Norisbank (2006), Berliner Bank (2006) and, most notably, Deutsche Postbank (2010). 
The consolidation of the German banking sector highlights the importance of 
collaboration and inter-firm networks in the form of friendly deals by fellow domestic 
firms (Kogut and Walker, 2001). Negotiated takeovers in the German banking industry, 
as well as in the non-financial sector, were facilitated by the presence of centrally 
located actors with ownership and/or director ties with both acquirers and target 
companies. The negotiated character of corporate transactions illustrates the presence of 
banks embedded in long-term, pre-existing relationships in the form of interlocking 
directorships and/or cross-shareholdings (Davis, Kogut, and Walker 2012; Grittersova, 
2014).
8
 The overall absence of foreign companies in the German banking sector reflects 
the use of ‘thick’ information in inter-company relationships built from long-term 
relations (Clark and Wojcik, 2007). The stability of inter-corporate network ties in 
Germany also sharply contrasts with the uncoordinated pattern of cross-shareholdings 
unwinding that took place in France in the late 1990s (see Culpepper, 2005).   
         Second, an important reform of the takeover code in 2001 enables the Co-
determined supervisory board of directors of German companies to introduce a number 
of defensive measures that could seriously impede the actions of outside bidders in 
restructuring acquired companies (Gordon, 2004). Basically, the German takeover code 
constitutes a rejection (via the opting out clause) of the board neutrality principle, itself 
inspired by the shareholder friendly UK City code, which has been adopted at EU level. 
The reform of the German takeover code was enacted in the wake of the implementation 
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of the KonTraG corporate law reform and of attempts by the EU Commission to 
harmonize takeover regulation. German policy-makers felt that domestic companies 
would be left in a position of asymmetric vulnerability since deviations from the one 
share-one vote principle had been eliminated in Germany, but not in many other EU 
member states (Clift, 2009; Hoepner, 2007).  
         Under the German Takeover Act (2001), several defensive measures are legally 
available to companies via the actions of their supervisory boards, most notably the 
search for a friendly competitive bidder (‘white knight’) with the incentive of new 
shares issued at discounted prices (but under the principle of one share-one vote), the 
selling off of coveted assets, and the undertaking of all actions allowed by German 
corporate law that are approved by the supervisory board and for which no approval of 
the shareholder assembly is necessary. A potential highly effective anti-takeover 
measure is the combination of two institutional arrangements that would seriously 
constrain the ability of a potential successful bidder to restructure the assets of the 
targeted company in the post-acquisition process: the introduction of a company by-law 
that would require supermajority vote (75%) for the implementation of post-acquisition 
restructuring measures (as specified by German corporate law); and the creation of a 
blockholding position for an existing shareholder or for a ‘white knight’ at 25% of 
equity capital of the company (Gordon, 2004: 551).
9
 The introduction of these two 
institutional arrangements, in turn, is itself facilitated by the overall absence of 
independent directors on supervisory boards: half of the directors are elected by 
employees; and the other shareholder-elected half is characterized by the prominent role 
of former managers. The composition of boards of directors works to significantly 
lessen the emphasis placed exclusively on shareholder interests (Roe, 1999). 
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         Third, the presence of constraints on the ability of a new owner to implement post-
acquisition reorganization strategies also highlights the importance of domestic 
institutional arrangements of employment laws (Capron and Guillen, 2009; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). Takeovers constitute an important strategic option by which companies 
develop new capabilities, gain access to new markets, and secure efficiency gains by the 
recombination of the resources of the bidding and target companies (Atanassov and 
Kim, 2009). These potential gains, however, are often contingent upon restructuring 
schemes that often entail asset restructuring and resource deployment in the form of 
employee layoffs of the target company. Labor markets in Germany are characterized 
by legal impediments on the implementation of strategies of external labor market 
flexibility, i.e. employee dismissals (OECD, 2004). Strong legal rights of employment 
protection enable employees to better defend their interests and to restrict the ability of 
the acquirers, even foreign ones, to implement post-acquisition restructuring schemes 
based on the extensive use of employee layoffs (Schneper and Guillen, 2004; Soskice, 
1999). 
10
   
         Fourth, the financial crisis of 2008-09 highlights the continuing insulation of 
German banks from foreign takeovers, but with the emerging activism of a new actor, 
namely the German federal government (Hardie and Howarth, 2009; Zimmermann, 
2012). German policy-makers have been active in protecting banks listed on the stock 
market from unwanted takeover bids. As in other advanced capitalist economies, credit 
guarantees and recapitalization via the injections of fresh funds were provided to 
domestic banks faced with serious financial problems (Weber and Schmitz, 2011). A 
budget of 400 billion Euros in credit guarantees and 80 billion Euros for recapitalization 
was made available under the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (FMSF), a financial 
assistance scheme set up in October 2008 by the German federal government. However, 
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German policy-makers went further than financially rescuing troubled banks. An 
important instance of the activism displayed by the German state lies in the rescue of 
the takeover of Dresdner Bank by Commerzbank. The latter suffered serious financial 
losses as a result of its exposure to the US subprime market that, in turn, threatened to 
derail its ability to acquire Dresdner Bank. The role of the German state was crucial in 
enabling Commerzbank to proceed with the takeover of Dresdner bank (Hardie and 
Howarth, 2009: 1031-2). Commerzbank was twice able to tap into the Financial Market 
Stabilization Fund (FMSF), a financial assistance scheme set up in October 2008 by the 
German federal government, for a total of 32.2 billion Euros. Moreover, the German 
federal government itself took an equity stake of 25% in Commerzbank. Therefore, the 
actions of the German state not only saved the takeover of Dresdner Bank, but also 
ensured the protection of Commerzbank from potential unwanted takeover bids via a 
25% equity stake in the bank that provided a veto on major company decisions.  
         We issue two final comments on the German case that illustrates the links between         
overall protection against unsolicited bids and systemic growth via takeovers (see Table 
2). First, the largest two German commercial banks have been able to proceed to fund 
their strategy of external growth without incurring debt. The use of cash has been 
limited in the largest takeover transactions involving Commerzbank and Deutsche 
Bank.
11
 Thus, the largest two German commercial banks have been able to pursue a 
takeover spree at home without committing extensive financial resources.  
         Second, the (hybrid) German banking sector is characterized by substantial 
divergence with regard to systemic growth. Commercial banks located in the first pillar 
have experienced systemic growth in the last 10-15 years. Regionally-based public 
sector banks (second pillar) and DZ Bank (third pillar), the central institution for about 
900 cooperative financial institutions, in contrast, have failed to grow in the last 10-15 
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years as measured by the ratio of their total financial assets over German GDP despite 
being insulated from unwanted takeover bids (concentrated ownership structure). This 
divergence reflects the legal status of banks in the second and third pillars that prevents 
them from becoming active participants as bidders on the market for corporate control. 
         The second pillar is composed of public sectors banks, namely the thirteen (now 
eight) regionally-based Landesbanken (LBs) and a little under 500 savings banks 
(Sparkassen). This segment of the German banking sector has been traditionally 
characterized by the prominence of a few large regional banks; most notably Bayern 
LB, LB Baden-Württemberg, LB Berlin, and West LB. Public sector banks are owned 
by their regional authorities and, therefore, are perfectly insulated from unsolicited 
takeover bids. They also operate in single regions, thus not entering into direct 
competition with LBs located in different geographical areas. The third pillar consists of 
about 2,000 cooperative banks, which often specialize in specific economic sectors. 
This segment of the German banking sector is dominated by DZ bank, the country’s 
fourth largest bank (in terms of assets), which served as the central institution for about 
900 cooperative financial institutions. Cooperative banks are owned by their members 
who are also their depositors, making it virtually impossible for them to be acquired by 
outsiders. Cooperative banks, like public sector banks, are geographically segmented 
and, thus, do not compete directly with other financial institutions belonging to the same 
pillar in other regions (Brunner, Decressin, Hardy and Kudela, 2004; IMF, 2011). 
        Nonetheless, the largest LBs and DZ bank have not experienced systemic growth 
in the last fifteen years despite being effectively insulated from unwanted takeover 
attempts. The lack of systemic growth of banks in the second and third pillars of the 
German banking system, instead, reflects their inability to become active participants as 
bidders. Their legal status acts as a barrier to the development of an external growth 
30 
 
strategy based on acquisitions: mergers between financial institutions located in 
different regions are a cumbersome process, as legislative changes in the legal mandate 
of LBs is required; the involvement of private investors faces significant hurdles, 
namely the restricted business opportunities that flow from the regional principle and 
the legal constraints associated with the obligation to meet the liabilities of all creditors 
(not just depositors); also the issuing of new equities as a means of payment in takeover 
transactions is difficult to perform since many of these banks are not listed and private 
shareholders of targeted companies would be reluctant to accept an equity swap and, 
thus, become minority investors in LBs (Brunner, Decressin, Hardy and Kudela, 2004).   
 
Conclusion  
This article examined the market for corporate control in French and German banking. 
Cross-border incursions into the Eurozone’s two largest economies, most notably those 
in the form of non-negotiated takeovers, have remained severely restrained in the area 
of banking. This outcome illustrates the marked ability of domestic banks to resist 
unsolicited takeover bids. Yet, most large French and German commercial banks have 
themselves been active acquirers of other financial institutions, thereby taking 
advantage of their position of overall protection against unsolicited takeover bids to 
expand their operations. This specific process of consolidation of the banking sector of 
the two countries, in turn, has resulted in the growth of French and German commercial 
banks in asset size in relation to the domestic GDP of the home country. The systemic 
growth of French and German banks in the last 10-15 years has been recorded by 
financial institutions that have been active participants on the markets for takeovers as 
acquirers as well as being exposed to structured products (securitization) in the United 
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States, thereby illustrating the insights of institutionally-based approaches for the 
analysis of systemic risks in French and German banking.  
         We have argued that the institutional settings in which individual banks are 
embedded constitutes an important explanans (independent variable) to account for the 
restrained character of takeovers in France and Germany (dependent variable). 
Institutions have enabled banks in the two countries to resist unsolicited bids by 
providing them with influence over corporate decisions related to takeovers. Yet, the 
similar outcome of low levels of foreign ownership in banking, via the ability of 
domestic banks to resist unsolicited bids, has been achieved through markedly distinct 
institutions. French and German banks have relied on different sets of institutional 
arrangements, themselves located at different points along the chain of decisions of 
takeover transactions, to secure protection from takeovers. The French case is 
characterized by the prominent role of the state in three areas: the privatization of the 
banking sector, the regulatory approval of takeover bids, and the management of the 
2008-09 financial crisis. Individual French banks, moreover, have also been able to 
insulate themselves against unsolicited bids via their ability to enact deviations from the 
one share-one vote standard. The presence of restrained markets for corporate control in 
German banking, in contrast, highlights the importance of tightly linked corporate 
networks, the legal authority of Co-determined boards of directors to enact anti-takeover 
measures, the presence of strong employment protection laws that militate against 
takeover bids contingent upon the implementation of post-acquisition restructuring 
schemes, and the (more recent) activism of the German federal government in 
protecting domestic financial institutions from their exposure to securitization-related 
financial losses.  
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         This study of takeovers in French and German banking illustrates a specific 
instance of the shortcomings associated with the larger phenomenon of banking sector 
protectionism (see Epstein, 2014a in this volume), namely the systemic growth of banks 
that are often perceived as being too-big-to-fail. The presence of domestic banks that are 
systemic in character constitutes a dilemma for policy-makers since restructuring, or 
unwinding, some of these banks would be particularly costly given their interconnecting 
role in the economy. Moreover, French and German banks might also be too big to 
receive a comprehensive and full bailout given the magnitude of the (potential) sums 
involved and the constraints associated with membership in the Eurozone, namely the 
inability of governments to print money or to implement currency devaluations (Blyth, 
2013: 71-75). The overall exposure of French and German banks to the rest of the 
Eurozone (private and sovereign debt) rivals the sums committed (debt guarantees and 
recapitalizations) by their national governments in the 2008-09 financial crisis 
(Degryse, 2012; Guardian, 2013).  
        Thus, we suggest that an understanding of the character of takeovers in French and 
German banking improves our grasp of one important feature of the multi-faceted 
process of the management of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, namely the formation 
of preferences of large creditor countries. A comprehensive analysis of the institutional 
context of the Eurozone policy-making process is clearly beyond the scope of this 
article (see De Grauwe, 2013; Hancké, 2013: 1-14). Nonetheless, it is interesting to note 
that the costs of adjustment to the turbulence on bond markets have been imposed 
disproportionately on debtor countries, not on lending institutions of creditor countries 
(Hall, 2012). The content of the bailout packages aimed at assisting Eurozone members 
targeted by bondholders were highly favorable to the interests of ‘exposed’ banks as 
financial assistance enabled creditor countries to service existing debts. The positions of 
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the French and German governments in the negotiation process were also highly 
insightful. They stringently opposed proposals by the IMF to impose losses on holders 
of senior bonds, i.e. French and German banks, during the negotiations of the Irish and 
the first Greek bailout packages (Bastasin, 2012: 135-159 and 233-236). French and 
German policy-makers also agreed on debt relief for the Greek government in the 
second bailout package, but only after domestic banks were able to off-load a 
substantial proportion of their Greek sovereign debt which was purchased by the 
European Central Bank as part of its Securities Markets Programme (Ibid: 218 and 
270). The asymmetric character of adjustment in the Eurozone is important since French 
and German banks are not only the biggest creditors to countries targeted by private 
bondholders, they are also large and susceptible to systemic risks (Goldstein and Véron, 
2011; Guardian, 2013). Previous international debt crises highlight how the presence of 
large, and heavily exposed, banks in creditor countries heightens the incentives of their 
own governments to push for policy agreements that assign the burdens of adjustment 
on debtor countries (Frieden, 1988).  
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Table 1 
 
Total Assets (% of French GDP) of Largest French Banks: 2000-2010  
  
2000 
 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
BNP-Paribas 
 
 
48.2
1
  
2
 
 
55.1 
 
46.3 
 
49.3 
 
54.4 
 
73.2
3
 
 
80.1 
 
89.8
4
 
 
107.2 
 
109.1 
 
100.8 
 
Crédit  
Agricole 
 
 
35.5 
 
36.5 
 
32.7
5
 
 
55.1 
 
55.2
6
 
 
68.1 
 
76.4 
 
81.6 
 
92.2 
 
89.2 
 
80.4 
 
Societé 
Générale 
 
 
31.6
7
 
 
34.3 
 
32.4 
 
34.1 
 
36.3 
 
48.6 
 
53.7 
 
56.8 
 
58.4 
 
54.2 
 
57.1 
 
Banque 
Populaire 
(BP) 
 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
14.3 
 
14.9 
 
15.1 
 
16.7 
 
16.9 
 
16.7 
 
10.8 
 
 
 
 
 
Caisse 
Epargne 
(CE) 
 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
23.1 
 
23.9 
 
32.8 
 
34.5 
 
30.1 
 
31.8 
 
32.7 
 
 
 
 
 
BPCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54.5 
 
52.9 
 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports, various years 
 
                                                 
1
 In 1999, the total assets/GDP ratio of BNP- Paribas a stand-alone financial institution was 28.3%. It 
climbed to 48.2% with its integration of the activities of Paribas (France). 
2
 Year preceding the acquisition of Banwest (United States).  
3
 Year preceding the acquisition of Banco Nazionale del Lavaro (Italy).  
4
 Year preceding the acquisition of Fortis (Belgium). 
5
 Year preceding the acquisition of Crédit Lyonnais (France). 
6
 Year preceding the acquisition of Keytrade Bank (Belgium).  
7
 Year preceding the acquisitions of TCW Group (United States) and Komerchi Banka (Czech Republic).  
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Table 2 
 
Total Assets (% of German GDP) of Largest German Banks: 2000-2010  
  
2000 
 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
Deutsche 
Bank 
 
45.9
8
  
 
46.3 
 
35.9 
 
37.4 
 
38.3 
 
44.5
9
 
 
48.6 
 
79.2 
 
80.9 
 
63.2
10
 
 
76.3 
 
Commerz- 
Bank 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
11.2 
 
11.5 
 
11.4 
 
20.1
11
 
 
26.3 
 
25.4 
 
25.2
12
 
 
35.5 
 
30.2 
 
DZ Bank 
 
16.8 
 
16.6 
 
15.7 
 
15.1 
 
16.2 
 
18.1 
 
10.9 
 
11.0 
 
17.2 
 
16.3 
 
13.1 
 
 
L.Baden-
Württemberg 
 
 
NA 
 
15.1 
 
15.0 
 
15.1 
 
17.7 
 
18.0 
 
18.0 
 
18.2 
 
18.1 
 
17.3 
 
13.1 
 
Source: Annual Reports, various years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The ratio of total assets/GDP of Deutsche Bank stood at 31.9% in 1998. It climbed to 41.9% after its 
integration of Bankers Trust (United States).  
9
 Year preceding its acquisitions of Berliner Bank (Germany) and Norisbank (Germany).  
10
 Year preceding its acquisition of Postbank (Germany).  
11
 Year preceding its acquisition of Eurohypo (Germany).  
12
 Year preceding its acquisition of Dresdner Bank.  
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1
 Foreign acquisitions of large French/German banks have been friendly/negotiated transactions and 
limited to two cases: Credit Commercial de France fell under the control of HSBC in 2000; and Hypo 
Vereinsbank was acquired by Unicredit in 2006.  
2
 The discussion of low foreign ownership in this article refers to the limited number of takeovers of 
domestic companies (French/German) by foreign bidders. The banking sector of French and Germany is 
characterized by the overall restrained presence of foreigners in the two countries with regard to the 
market for corporate control. Minority participations by foreign mutual and hedge funds with a primary 
interest on shareholder value, in contrast, have skyrocketed with a specific concentration in France 
(Goyer, 2006 and 2011; Morin, 1998a).     
3
The retail operations of HSBC in France, in turn, were themselves purchased by the French mutual group 
Banque Populaire in 2008.   
4
 This form of complex causation, conjunctural causation, emphasizes how different institutions interact 
with each other to generate a specific outcome that would not occur in the absence of any of these 
institutions (Ragin, 1987). Individual institutions as causal variables are necessary but not sufficient to 
generate the outcome of interest on the dependent variable. 
5
 BNP-Paribas paid 9 billion euros in new stock issues and 5.5 billion euros in cash for Fortis.  
6
 The use of equity swaps as a means of payment was prominent in the following transactions: Crédit 
Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais; Banque Populaire-Caisse d’Epargne; BNP/Paribas-Fortis; and BNP/Paribas-
Banco Nazionale del Lavoro. 
7
 Banque Nationale de Paris issued a substantial number of new stocks (in percentage of outstanding 
shares) in order to finance its acquisition of Paribas in 1999. 
8
 For instance, Commerzbank and Dresdner bank were united by their shared long-term relationship ties 
with Allianz while the acquisition of Postbank by Deutsche Bank was facilitated by their common, and 
long-term, ties to Deutsche Post. 
9
 In other words, a stockholding position of 25% would enable a large owner to exercise a veto power 
over the actions of a potential acquirer. 
10
 For instance, the only major foreign incursion in the German banking sector, i.e. the acquisition of 
HypoVereinsbank by Unicredit in 2006, did not lead to a restructuring of the former. The total number of 
HypoVereinsbank employees based in Germany was 20,343 in 2005, i.e. the year preceding its 
acquisition by Unicredit. The corresponding figure for 2012 was 19, 247. Similarly, the total financial 
assets of HypoVereinsbank were 312.4 billion euros in 2005 and 348.3 billion euros in 2012 (see 
HypoVereinsbank, annual report, various years). 
11
 The use of equity swap was prominent in two transactions, namely Deutsche Bank-Deutsche Post and 
Commerzbank-Dresdner Bank. The issue of new shares to pay for the acquisition of another financial 
institution was particularly important in three deals, namely Deutsche Bank-Bankers Trust, Deutsche 
Bank-Postbank; and Commerzbank-Eurohypo. 
